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Top Secret

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# Warning Page Deleted B-3



## Contents

		<b>b (1)</b> b (3)
	1	<b>U(1)</b> D(0)
Sudan: New Cabinet	2	
	03,6) 3	
Notes	v ·	
Jane Strand Comments of the Co	₹4 ₺	sl,
	4 6	23
Section 1997	5	
	5	
and the second s	6	اران
	6	73
In Brief	7	
Special Analyses		- "
	hl, h3 8	
	bl., b3 8 10	<del></del>
Cyprus-UN: Problems Facing Peacekeepi		
	3 14	

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
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b (1) b (3)

103

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Jop Secret

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SUDAN:

**New Cabinet** 

Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq's second cabinet, named last week, is unlikely to improve government performance.

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The two major parties, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist, share the most important cabinet posts, as in Sadiq's first cabinet. Three southern parties have one ministry each. The cabinet has been expanded from 20 to 24 portfolios, but four posts are still vacant. Sadiq, the Umma Party leader, will keep the Defense portfolio. Democratic Unionist Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad will replace the sluggish Zayn al-Hindi as Foreign Minister, and another Democratic Unionist, Ibrahim Abd al-Galli, will take over the Trade Ministry from Muhammad Abu Hurayra, whose disputes with government colleagues helped prompt the cabinet shuffle.

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Sadiq undoubtedly hoped the shuffle would get rid of incompetent or troublesome ministers, would show his intention to improve government handling of the economy and the southern insurgency, and would distract the disgruntled military leadership. The two most irksome ministers are gone, but there is unlikely to be much respite from inter- and intra-party bickering or much progress toward consensus on pressing issues. The Islamic Front's exclusion means its leaders will continue criticizing Sadiq's policies at every turn.

Sadiq's efforts to shore up public confidence come as John Garang's southern insurgents have scored disheartening victories against two Army garrisons in the south. Despite a deep reluctance to overthrow Sudan's democratically elected officials, military officers may increasingly question the policies of the government if more defeats occur

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
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Fop Secret b (3)

Jop Secret 63

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8 June 1987

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
In Brief Europe bi Greece formed special counterterrorist assault unit to protect cruise ships calling there teams will be assigned to Greek ships this month ... will ヤコ .. heavily armed significantly improve security. Middle East blb3 61,63 **Americas** ৮১ Argentina opening 30 new areas for oil exploration bids, terms, locations more attractive to foreign

firms than earlier offerings . . . discoveries needed to offset

slipping production, reduce rapid import growth.

Top Secret 8 June 1987

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8 June 1987

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Fop Secret 193

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
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### **Special Analysis**

#### CYPRUS-UN:


### **Problems Facing Peacekeeping Force**

The UN Security Council will almost certainly renew the six-month mandate of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) again this month, but several difficulties raise serious questions about the unit's continued viability. Any weakening of UNFICYP, which has served as a buffer between Greeks and Turks on the Island for 23 years, could endanger the Cyprus settlement process and even raise the specter of renewed hostilities.

UNFICYP—the only UN force funded by voluntary contributions from UN member states—faces a perennial financing problem. Currently only 73 members contribute, most at low levels, and UNFICYP is running a deficit of about \$145 million. As a result, reimbursemente of expenses to troop-contributing countries have been delayed. Stockholm's total contribution to UNFICYP, for example, has swollen to three times its annual UN assessment.

These financing problems and lack of progress in the UN negotiations have prompted some contributors to reassess their involvement in UNFICYP. Sweden announced last February that it would withdraw its force of 392-16 percent of the UNFICYP total-by 1 January unless the unit's funding problems were alleviated or there was some movement in the UN negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Swedes have recently indicated they might reduce their force by half rather than completely withdraw, but financial concerns may yet force them to pull out.

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op Secret 8 June 1987



# Cyprus: UN Force in Trouble

UN troops have been stationed on Cyprus since March 1964, when intercommunal violence prompted the UN to establish an international peacekeeping mission there. UNFICYP's initial three-month mandate was soon lengthened to six months, and it has been extended every June and December since

Although beefed up during the 1974 Turkish military intervention, UNFICYP's strength has declined steadily from 6,500 men in 1964 to its current size of about 2,300. Most of the force patrols the Green Line between the Greek south and the Turkisii north, but small contingents remain scattered throughout the Island





### **Outlook and Implications**

Troop contributors will grow increasingly reluctant if the funding problems remain unsolved and if there is no sign of progress on resolving the Cyprus dispute. The UN probably would fail to persuade a new country to send troops to Cyprus or a current contributor to increase its force to fill in any gap.

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
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